NOTES
Demystifying Ambiguous Statutes with the Maxims of
Statutory Interpretation: A Closer Look at J.D. Tan,
LLC v. Summers
Alexander Kleinberg*
In July of 2001, Division One of the Washington Court of Appeals decided J.D. Tan, LLC v. Summers,' a creditors' rights case that
turned on the meaning of an ambiguous state statute. In an opinion
that is noticeably long on brevity and slight on reasoning, an undivided panel of the court held the statute at issue 2 was not ambiguous
and was not in need of judicial interpretation.3 Because the court mistakenly determined that this convoluted law was not ambiguous, it
failed to judicially interpret this statute by applying the maxims of
statutory interpretation. Not only did this mistake lead to an erroneous outcome, but it also cost J.D. Tan, LLC approximately $1.8 million, not including attorneys' fees.
* J.D. Candidate 2003, Seattle University School of Law; B.A., University of Washington, 1997.
I would like to thank my colleagues at the Seattle University Law Review for their tireless and
unyielding devotion to the pursuit of excellence. It has been both an honor and a privilege to
work alongside such a talented group of individuals.
1. 107 Wash. App. 266, 26 P.3d 1006 (2001).
2. The statute at issue was WASH. REV. CODE § 6.17.020(3) (2001). This statute pertains
to the enforcement of judgments. When the J.D. Tan case was decided, subsection (3) of this
statute provided, in relevant part:
a party in whose favor a judgment has been rendered pursuant to subsection (1) ... of
this section may, within ninety days before the expiration of the original ten-year period, apply to the court that rendered the judgment for an order granting an additional
ten years during which an execution may be issued.
Subsection (1) of this statute referred to original judgment holders and assignees alike. The
question presented in J.D. Tan was whether an assignee had the right of extension provided by
subsection (3) when assignees were not specifically named in subsection (3), but were instead
named in subsection (1), and these two subsections cross-referenced each other.
3. J.D. Tan, LLC, 107 Wash. App. at 269, 26 P.3d at 1008.
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Given the scope of the quandary evidenced by the court's holding in J.D. Tan, this Note stresses the need for holding the Washington judiciary accountable for carrying out its duty: the judicial interpretation of statutes that are unequivocally ambiguous. This Note
puts forth the J.D. Tan case as an example of how Washington's
courts can properly resolve future cases in which the meaning of a law
is unclear by applying the maxims of statutory interpretation. Should
this occur, good things will happen: patently absurd or unfair results
will be diminished, as will societal waste in the form of needless litigation and uncollected debts.
Section I begins with a brief discussion of the maxims of statutory interpretation and an explanation of how courts employ them to
determine an enigmatic law's meaning. Section II provides a history
of the J.D. Tan case, including a chronicle of the underlying dispute
between the principal debtor, William Summers, and the assighee of
the judgment holder, J.D. Tan, LLC. Section III explains why the
statute at issue in J.D. Tan, RCW 6.17.020(3), was ambiguous when
this case was decided, and how this statute was in need of judicial interpretation via application of the maxims of statutory interpretation.
Section IV analyzes how the J.D. Tan court could have reached a correct result by interpreting the ambiguous statute through the application of four particular maxims of statutory interpretation. Finally,
Section V concludes with a summary of this Note, along with a policy
analysis explaining why a court that is faced with an ambiguous statute should proceed in a manner different from the manner chosen by
the court in J. D. Tan.
I. THE MAXIMS OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

A maxim is a concisely expressed principle or rule of conduct.'
Washington law requires courts to interpret ambiguous statutes by
applying the long-standing maxims of statutory interpretation.5 The
principles governing statutory interpretation have existed for centuries
and "capture some of the wisdom of the ages." 6 They "are intended to
function as a basis for [judicial] decision making, theoretically elevating decisions above mere result-oriented analysis because the rulings

4. WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY (UNABRIDGED) 1112 (2d
1979).

ed.

5. See Vashon Island Comm. for Self-Gov't v. State Boundary Review Bd., 127 Wash. 2d
759, 771, 903 P.2d 953, 959 (1995).
6. MICHAEL SINCLAIR, GUIDE TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 140 (2000).
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appear grounded in a historically tested maxim." 7 In essence, these
principles of statutory construction are designed to provide courts
with guidance in situations where the scope or meaning of a statute is
unclear.'
II. THE HISTORY OFJ.D. TAN, LLC v. SUMMERS
On March 30, 1990, Evergreen Park of Richmond Limited Partnership and Creekside of Kirkland Limited Partnership obtained two
money judgments against William Summers and his business partners, James Summers and Darrell Fischer, and against each of their
wives.9
The judgments were in the respective amounts of
$1,079,071.74 and $673,695.52, totaling almost $1.8 million.1"
Within two days after entry of the judgments, William Summers
and his partners filed for bankruptcy protection, and the resulting
bankruptcy stay provision immediately took effect, barring any collection efforts.1' After pending for over six years, the bankruptcy proceeding was dismissed on August 13, 1996.12 Although his wife was
granted a discharge, Summers' discharge was denied for transferring
property with the "intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors."' 3
According to the bankruptcy proceeding record, Summers had engaged in consummate game playing with his assets for the purpose of
retaining those assets for his own use and denying his creditors access
14
to recovery.
Once a judgment has been entered, Washington law gives the
holder of the judgment a period of ten years to enforce payment.'1 At
the time of the J.D. Tan case, subsection (1) of RCW 6.17.020 read as
follows:
Except as provided in subsections (2), (3), and (4) of this section,
the party in whose favor a judgment of a court of record of this
state or a district court of this state has been or may be rendered,
or the assignee, may have an execution issued for the collection or

7. Philip A. Talmadge, A New Approach to Statutory Interpretation in Washington, 25
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 179, 193 (2001).
8. See id.
9. J.D. Tan, LLC v. Summers, 107 Wash. App. 266, 267, 26 P.3d 1006, 1007 (2001).
10. Id. at 267, 26 P.3d at 1007.
11. Appellant's Opening Brief at 6, J.D. Tan, LLC v. Summers, 107 Wash. App. 266, 26
P.3d 1006 (2001) (No. 46848-1-I).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. WASH. REV. CODE § 6.17.020(1) (2001).
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enforcement of the judgment
at any time within ten years from
16
entry of the judgment.
On February 11, 2000, less than two months before the expiration of the ten-year execution period, the two judgments entered in favor of Evergreen Park and Creekside were assigned to Judgment Services, a collection agency. 7 Judgment Services obtained a court order
on February 17, 2000, that extended the judgments for an additional
ten years pursuant to RCW 6.17.020(3). It is at this point where the
trouble began.
The court provided Judgment Services with the additional tenyear execution period that is available to judgment holders under
RCW 6.17.020(3)."8 However, at this time the statute did not specifi-

cally name assignees as parties that were afforded this right of extension. Instead, subsection (3) read in relevant part as follows:
[A] party in whose favor a judgment has been rendered pursuant
to subsection (1) or (4) of this section may, within ninety days before the expiration of the original ten-year period, apply to the
court that rendered the judgment for an order granting an additional ten years during which an execution may be issued. .."
Several months after the judgments were extended, Judgment
Services assigned them to J.D. Tan, LLC, a collection agency.2" J.D.
Tan quickly commenced proceedings to enforce the judgments by filing a motion for a temporary restraining order that sought to enjoin
the defendants from transferring, encumbering, or disposing of certain
assets, pending execution upon the judgments.2 1 The temporary restraining order was granted; at this time J.D. Tan also moved for an
order to show cause why the temporary restraining order should not
be converted to a preliminary injunction.2 2 About one month later,
following a show cause hearing, J.D. Tan's request for a preliminary
injunction was denied when the trial court held that an assignee had
no authority to extend a judgment beyond its original ten-year term
under RCW 6.17.020(3).23 The court reasoned that the Legislature's
omission of the words "or the assignee" in subsection (3) was not "a
16. Id. (emphasis added.)
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

J.D. Tan, LLC, 107 Wash. App. At 267, 26 P.3d at 1007.
Id.
WASH. REV. CODE § 6.17.020(3) (Emphasis added).
J.D. Tan, LLC, 107 Wash. App. at 267, 26 P.3d at 1007.
Id.
Id. at 267-68, 26 P.3d at 1007.
Id. at 268, 26 P.3d at 1007.
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mere clerical error" that the court had the power to correct. 2' As a result, the court concluded the statute was not ambiguous and was,
therefore, not in need of judicial interpretation.25
Summers moved for a declaratory judgment that would vacate
the order of February 17, 2000 and declare the judgments void as a
matter of law. 26 The court granted this motion on June 21, 2000, and

J.D. Tan appealed.27 On appeal, a panel of three judges held that28

RCW 6.17.020(3) did not provide assignees the right of extension.
The court further held that the statute was not ambiguous because it
could not "reasonably be understood to apply to assignees of judgments as well as to original judgment creditors., 29 The court did not
address the arguments made by J.D. Tan.3"
The conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals in J.D. Tan is
especially susceptible to criticism given that questions of statutory
construction are reviewed de novo, meaning that the reviewing court
was not bound by the trial court's application of the law in the under-

lying proceedings."1
III. RCW 6.17.020(3) WAS AMBIGUOUS BECAUSE IT WAS
SUSCEPTIBLE TO AT LEAST Two REASONABLE MEANINGS

Even though assignees were not specifically named in the statute
when this case was decided, J.D. Tan's contention that RCW
6.17.020(3) could be reasonably read to include assignees is persuasive
for two reasons.3 2 First, Washington law has long called for the spirit
24. Id.
25. Id. at 269, 26 P.3d at 1008.
26. Id. at 267, 26 P.3d at 1007.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 269, 26 P.3d at 1008.
29. Id.
30. Several of the arguments made by the appellant have been utilized in this Note. In its
Opening Brief, Appellant J.D. Tan argued, inter alia, (1) that Washington Revised Code §
6.17.020(3) could be plainly understood to refer to assignees; (2) that the statute's legislative history did not demonstrate a legislative intent to discriminate against assignees; (3) that prior judicial interpretation of the statute compelled the conclusion that the statute applied to assignees;
(4) that the rules of statutory construction did not support an unduly restrictive interpretation of
the statute; and, in a different vein, (5) that the statute of limitations for the enforcement of the
judgments was tolled for at least two years during the pendency of William Summers' bankruptcy, the result being that the period during which the judgments may be enforced had not yet
expired. Appellant's Opening Brief at 6, J.D. Tan, LLC (No. 46848-1-I).
31. State v. Ammons, 136 Wash. 2d 453, 456, 963 P.2d 812, 813 (1998).
32. At the time of the court's holding in J.D. Tan, WASH. REV. CODE § 6.17.020(1) provided:
Except as provided in subsections (2), (3), and (4) of this section, the party in whose
favor a judgment of a court of record of this state or a district court of this state has
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of the law to prevail over its letter and for the civil portion of the Revised Code of Washington to be "liberally construed."33 A liberal
construction of RCW 6.17.020(3) would have afforded assignees
rights that were identical to those enjoyed by original judgment holders.
Moreover, a liberal construction of RCW 6.17.020(3) comports
with fundamental tenets of property law, which favors the free alienability of property rights. 4 One reason why free alienability of property has long been encouraged is because this policy promotes the efficient utilization of resources.3" Construing RCW 6.17.020(3) to
include assignees comports with this public policy. The original
judgment creditor, who may be unwilling or unable to execute its
judgment, could nevertheless obtain redress by selling its judgment to
an assignee and cashing out its ownership interest in the debt. As a
result, a valuable resource (which in the case of J.D. Tan consisted of
two judgments totaling almost $1.8 million) would not go to waste by
escaping collection.
J.D. Tan further bolstered its cause when it argued that the plain
meaning of RCW 6.17.020(3) rendered the statute applicable to both
assignees and original judgment holders alike.3 6 This result can be
reached by dissecting the meaning of the phrase "rendered pursuant to
subsection (1)." Furthermore, it is unlikely that the absence of the
words "or the assignee" in subsection (3) was the result of a clear intent by the Legislature to deprive assignees of the benefits provided by
subsection (3), for there is nothing in the statute's legislative history
that supports the existence of a unifying regulatory scheme.37 These
contentions will be addressed seriatim.
been or may be rendered, or the assignee, may have an execution issued for the collection or enforcement of the judgment at any time within ten years from entry of the
judgment.
WASH. REV. CODE § 6.17.020(3) (2001) provided, in relevant part:
a party in whose favor a judgment has been rendered pursuant to subsection (1)... of
this section may, within ninety days before the expiration of the original ten-year period, apply to the court that rendered the judgment for an order granting an additional
ten years during which an execution may be issued.
33. Matter of R., 97 Wash. 2d 182, 187, 641 P.2d 704, 707 (1982); see also WASH. REV.
CODE § 1.12.010 (2001).
34. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 10-13 (4th ed. 1992).
35. Id.
36. See J.D. Tan, LLC, 107 Wash. App. at 269, 26 P.3d at 1008.
37. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 15, J.D. Tan, LLC (No. 46848-1-I) (indicating that
legislators were aware of the collection agency lobbyists' interest in passing SB 6045 (SB 6045
eventually became Wash. Rev. Code § 6.17.020(3)) but legislators did not seek to differentiate
between assignee judgment holders and original judgment holders.
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A. Meaning of the "Rendered Pursuantto" Phrase

Courts often enlist the help of a dictionary when interpreting an
ambiguous statute.38 Subsection (3) of RCW 6.17.020 provided that
"a party in whose favor a judgment has been rendered pursuant to
subsection (1) or (4) of this section may [apply for a ten year extension
during which an execution may be issued]." 39 Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary defines render as "to cause to be or become;
to make."' 40 Substituting this definition for the word "render" in subsection (3) illustrates how the statute could have been read to have an
entirely different meaning than the one given to it by the J.D. Tan
court: "a party in whose favor a judgment has been [caused to be]
pursuant to subsection (1) or (4) of this section" may apply to the
court for a ten-year extension to execute the judgment. 41 This interpretation suggests that an assignee judgment holder can receive the
ten-year extension provided by subsection (3) because an assignee
judgment holder's interest in the judgment was "caused to be"
"pursuant to subsection (1)," for assignees are specifically named in
subsection (1) of RCW § 6.17.020.42 By giving the word "rendered"
its plain meaning, it becomes apparent that subsection (3) applied to
assignees, because their interests as judgment holders were "caused to
be" "pursuant to subsection (1)."
Notwithstanding the contention set forth above, Summers successfully argued that assignees were not within the contemplated class
of judgment holders to whom the Legislature sought to convey the
right of extension because they were not specifically named in subsection (3).43 Gven that a court must, above all else, search for legislative
intent when construing a statute,4 4 Summers should not have won this
argument.
The Legislature intended to afford assignees all of the rights and
protections enjoyed by original judgment creditors, including the right
to receive a ten-year extension upon which a judgment may be executed. Assignees were specifically named in subsection (1), and subsection (3) included, in relevant part, the language "a party in whose
favor a judgment has been rendered pursuant to subsection (1)."
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
LLC v.
44.

See, e.g., Chickasaw Nation v. U.S., 534 U.S. 84 (2001).
See WASH. REV. CODE § 6.17.020(3) (2001).
WEBSTER'S, supra note 4 at 1530 (2d ed. 1979).
See WASH. REV. CODE § 6.17.020(3) (2001).
Id.
See Brief of Respondents William Summers and Karen F. Summers at 14, J.D. Tan,
Summers, 107 Wash. App. 266, 26 P.3d 1006 (2001) (No. 46848-1-I).
Reid v. King County, 35 Wash. App. 720, 722, 669 P.2d 502, 503 (1983).
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Moreover, if a statute is susceptible of two interpretations, the
one which best advances the overall legislative purpose should be
adopted.4" Because the purpose of RCW 6.17.020 is to enable the
execution of judgments, reading subsection (3) to include assignees
makes sense. Such a reading advances the purpose of RCW 6.17.020
because this interpretation applies to a broader class of judgment
holders; both original judgment creditors and assignees would be protected under this interpretation.46
In addition to advancing the legislative purpose behind RCW
6.17.020, reading subsection (3) to include assignees is the most logical
construction of the statute. The phrase "pursuant to subsection
(1)... of this section" contained in subsection (3) is most logically
construed to incorporate the provisions of subsection (1) into subsection (3), which refer to the execution of judgments by an original
judgment creditor "or the assignee. ' 47 Although the words "or the assignee" were absent from subsection (3) when J.D. Tan was decided, it
is highly unlikely that this absence was the result of a clear intent by
the legislature to deprive assignees of the benefits of subsection (3).
This is because the textual differences between subsections (1) and (3)
of RCW 6.17.020 were not part and parcel of a single unified statutory
scheme.4 8
B. There Is No Evidence that the Legislature Intended to Set Apart
Assignees and OriginalJudgment CreditorsBecause the History of RCW
6.17.020 Does not Indicate the Presence of a Unifying Regulatory Scheme
for DifferentiatingBetween these Classes of Judgment Holders
When analyzing a statute, Washington courts aim to carry out
the intent of the Legislature.4 9 Because scant evidence exists to prove
that the Legislature intended to differentiate between assignees and
original judgment creditors, textual differences alone are insufficient
to infer a legislative intent to limit the application of subsection (3) to
original judgment holders. This is especially true given the absence of
a unifying regulatory scheme for differentiating between these classes
of judgment holders in the statute's history.
It is clear from its lengthy existence and sporadic amendments
that RCW 6.17.020 is not part of a unifying regulatory scheme de45. Id. at 722, 669 P.2d at 503.
46. See WASH. REV. CODE § 6.17.020 (2001).
47. Appellant's Opening Brief at 36, J.D. Tan, LLC (No. 46848-1-I) (emphasis added).
48. Id.
49. Talmadge, supra note 7, at 183 (citing Whatcom County v. City of Bellingham, 128
Wash. 2d 537, 546, 909 P.2d 1303, 1308 (1996).
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signed to differentiate between classes of judgment holders. The statute was originally enacted in 1929, but it was not until sixty-five years
later that it was amended to provide for the right to extend a judgment, as is codified in the present subsection (3). 0 The present subsection (1) was originally enacted in 1929 as RCW 6.04.020.1 In
1980, that section of the statute was amended to substitute "ten years"
for the original six-year period during which a judgment could be collected. 52 In 1989, subsection (2) was added, 3 providing that "a party
who obtains a judgment or order of a court of record of any state, or an
administrative order... for accrued child support" may execute at any
time within ten years after the eighteenth birthday of the youngest
person named in the child support order.5 4 Additionally, the 1989
amendments modified subsection (1) to include the words "except as
provided in subsection (2) of this section."5 5 Finally, subsection (3)
was added in 1994, and subsection (1) was amended to provide, "except as provided in subsections (2) and (3) of this section....""
Considering the lengthy history of RCW 6.17.020, along with its
sporadic and varying additions and amendments, it is reasonable to
believe that the omission of the words "or the assignee" from subsection (3) was mere oversight. Perhaps the draftsmen of subsection (3)
believed the phrase "rendered pursuant to subsection (1)" was sufficient to include assignees within the contemplated class of original
judgment holders with the right of extension. 7 Nevertheless, unless
legislative intent is clear, courts should be slow to adopt a construction
of a statute that is in derogation of property rights and the state's
power to create them." Given these parameters, it is unreasonable to
infer from the textual difference alone a legislative intent to limit the
application of subsection (3) solely to original judgment holders in
what would be a dramatic and unprecedented manner.59

50. Appellant's Opening Brief at 36,J.D. Tan, LLC (No. 46848-1-I).

51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 36-37.
55. Id. at 37.
56. Id. (emphasis added).
57. See id. As an aside, this error serves as a prime example as to why lawmakers should
strive for the utmost degree of clarity when crafting law in today's ultra-litigious society.
58. PUD v. Seattle, 382 F.2d 666, 670 (9th Cir. 1967).
59. Appellant's Opening Brief at 37, J.D. Tan, LLC (No. 46848-1-I).
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IV. INASMUCH AS RCW 6.17.020(3) WAS SUSCEPTIBLE TO AT
LEAST Two REASONABLE MEANINGS, IT REQUIRED JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION VIA APPLICATION OF THE MAXIMS OF
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION.

The Washington judiciary claims the exclusive power to interpret the acts of the Legislature.6" When a statute is susceptible to at
least two reasonable meanings it is ambiguous, and courts must then
resort to an interpretative process to ascertain the Legislature's meaning.6 The Court of Appeals was duty-bound to judicially interpret
RCW 6.17.020(3) by applying the maxims of statutory interpretation.62 The court failed to discharge this duty because it erroneously
concluded that RCW 6.17.020(3) was not ambiguous and not in need
of judicial interpretation. This conclusion was beside the mark because subsection (3) could have been reasonably understood to apply
to assignees.
Judicial interpretation of RCW 6.17.020(3) could have properly
settled the confused legal issues presented by J.D. Tan. Subsection (3)
could have been interpreted to both include and exclude assignees
from the class of judgment holders that were afforded the right of extension. 63 Because these interpretations directly conflict with one another, the J.D. Tan court should have resolved this tension by ascertaining the Legislature's intent by applying the maxims of statutory
interpretation.
Perhaps the greatest difficulty in applying the maxims of statutory interpretation lies not with their actual application, per se, but in
choosing which maxims to apply in a given situation.64 In actuality,
there "are literally so many canons of statutory construction, often
diametrically opposed to one another, that the courts may pick and
choose those canons most favorable to the ultimate disposition the
court wishes to achieve. ' 6' Although there is no bright line rule for
determining which maxims should be employed, the facts and circumstances of the case at hand seem particularly well-suited for application of the following four maxims: (1) remedial statutes should be con60. Talmadge, supra note 7, at 182.
61. See Vashon Island Comm. for Self-Gov't v. State Boundary Review Bd., 127 Wash. 2d
759, 771, 903 P.2d 953, 959 (1995).

62. Talmadge, supra note 7, at 184, (citing State v. Wilson, 125 Wash. 2d 212, 216, 883
P.2d 320, 322 (1994) (stating that the court is "ultimate authority" on meaning and purpose of
statute)).
63. See WASH. REV. CODE§ 6.17.020(3) (2001).
64. Talmadge, supra note 7, at 180.
65. Id.
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strued in accordance with common law;66 (2) statutes in derogation of
common law rights must be strictly construed;6 7 (3) the purpose of an
ambiguous statute is to be determined through comparison to other
related statutes; 68 and (4) the intent of the Legislature in crafting a
statute is of paramount importance in determining its meaning, and it
is the role of the judiciary to ascertain that intent.69
These particular maxims were selected because 6.17.020 is a remedial statute that involves property rights and comes without any
helpful legislative history. Each of the maxims listed above will be
applied to the facts of J.D. Tan to demonstrate how the court could
have reached a correct result had it determined RCW 6.17.020(3) was,
in fact, ambiguous.
A. The Maxim "Remedial Statutes Are to be Liberally Construed"
Should Have Been Applied Since RCW 6.17.020(3) Is a Remedial
Statute Whose Purpose Is to Compensate a Party Who Has Suffered
FinancialLoss.
A statute is "remedial" when it relates to a practice, procedure, or
remedy7" and does not affect a substantive or vested right.71 Any
doubt as to the meaning of a statute should be resolved in favor of the
claimant for whose benefit the act was passed.72 Statutes providing
remedies against either public or private wrongs are to be liberally
construed.73
RCW 6.17.020 is a remedial statute because it relates to procedures for collection of judgments and to remedies available to judg-

66. Appellant's Opening Brief at 29, J.D. Tan, LLC (No. 46848-1-I) (citing State v. Douty,
92 Wash. 2d930, 936, 603 P.2d 373, 376 (1979)).
67. See, e.g., Crystal, China and Gold, Ltd. v. Factoria Ctr. Investments, Inc., 93 Wash.
App. 606, 610, 969 P.2d 1093, 1096 (1999).
68. Appellant's Opening Brief at 32, J.D. Tan, LLC (No. 46848-1-I) (citing Ropo, Inc. v.
Seattle, 67 Wash. 2d 574, 409 P.2d 148 (1965)).
69. Whatcom County v. City of Bellingham, 128 Wash. 2d 537, 546, 909 P.2d 1303, 1308
(1996).
70. Note how both "procedure" and "remedy" seem to be contained in WASH. REV. CODE
§ 6.17.020: the procedure is how to apply for the ten-year extension under Subsection (3), and the
remedy (concededly more subtle) is the additional time to execute the judgment in order to satisfy
the underlying debt.
71. Appellant's Opening Brief at 29, J.D. Tan, LLC (No. 46848-1-1) (citing Miebach v.
Colasurdo, 102 Wash. 2d 170, 181, 685 P.2d 1074, 1081 (1984)).
72. Appellant's Opening Brief at 29,J.D. Tan, LLC(No. 46848-1-I).
73. Id. (citing State v. Superior Court of Pierce County, 104 Wash. 268, 272, 176 P. 352,
353 (1918)).
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ment creditors. Accordingly, it should be construed liberally to promote the purpose for which it was enacted."4
The notion that remedial statutes should be liberally construed
has long been embedded in this State's jurisprudence,7" as seen from
the Washington Supreme Court's 1913 decision in Peet v. Mills. The
issue in Peet was whether an employee who was injured on the job
could sue the president of his corporate employer for negligence.7 6
Horace Peet was a motorman for the Seattle, Renton & Southern
Railway Company.77 On what was presumably a foggy day in January
of 1912, he was injured in a collision between two railcars.7" Peet was
unable to sue the railway company because of the recently enacted
Workmen's Compensation Act of 1911, which declared "all civil actions and civil causes of action for such personal injuries ...[against
an employer] are hereby abolished, except in this act as provided."'7 9
Instead, Peet sued the railway company's president for negligence and
sought to hold him personally liable, alleging that the president had
broken his promise to employees that a signal system would be used
on foggy days to avert accidents."0 Even though the statute explicitly
forbade suit only against employers, the court held Peet did not have a
cause of action against the president.8 1
Finding that the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1911 was a
remedial statute, the court reasoned as follows:
It is a well-accepted rule that remedial statutes, seeking the correction of recognized errors and abuses in introducing some new
regulation... should be construed with regard to the former law
and the defects or evils sought to be cured and the remedy provided; that in so construing such statutes they should be interpreted liberally, to the end that the purpose of the Legislature in
suppressing the mischief and advancing the remedy be promoted, even to the inclusion of cases within the reason, although
outside the letter, of the statute. .82

74. Appellant's Opening Brief at 29, J.D. Tan, LLC (citing State v. Douty, 92 Wash. 2d
930, 936, 603 P.2d 373, 376 (1979)).
75. See, e.g., Peet v. Mills, 76 Wash. 437, 439, 136 P. 685, 686 (1913); Int'l Ass'n. of Fire
fighters, Local 46 v. City of Everett, 146 Wash. 2d 29, 34, 42 P.3d 1265, 1267 (2002).
76. Peet, 76 Wash. at 438, 136 P.2d at 685.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 439, 136 P. at 686.
80. Id. at 438, 136 P. at 685.
81. Id. at 439, 136 P. at 686 (emphasis added).
82. Id. (emphasis added).
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In the case at hand, even if a lingering doubt remained as to the
meaning of RCW 6.17.020(3) after the statute's legislative history (or
lack thereof) had been considered, the statute should have been construed in favor of protecting the rights of judgment creditors and their
assignees, not those of debtors, because of its remedial nature. In the
current setting, it is the judgment creditor, not the debtor, who has
been given a remedy. After all, the existence of the judgment itself is
per se evidence that the judgment creditor (or its assignee) is entitled to
remuneration, whether it is for services rendered, money lent, goods
sold, or damages incurred. Therefore, RCW 6.17.020(3) is remedial
because its purpose is to provide a remedy to the judgment holder in
the form of a ten-year extension during which the judgment can be
executed.
The concept that remedial statutes are to be liberally construed
also befits the notion of fundamental fairness. Justice is best served by
protecting the party who has suffered a loss, and has properly sought
redress for its injury by obtaining a legally enforceable mandate for relief in the form of a judgment. Surely it makes more sense to favor the
judgment holder over the debtor; to conclude otherwise would sanction the debtor's use and enjoyment of unwarranted, potentially illgotten returns, for which it would not be obligated to make restitution.
B. Statutes in Derogationof Common Law Rights Must Be Strictly
Construed.
The J.D. Tan court's reading of RCW 6.17.020(3) appears to be
in derogation of the common law rights of an assignee since the assignee historically "stands in the shoes" of the assignor and takes all of
the rights which the assignor had at the time of the assignment.83 For
example, in Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Merchants Rating & Adjusting Co., the court held that an assignee of a claim for collection has
rights equal to those of the original claimant.84 Washington law requires courts to strictly construe statutes that are in derogation of
common law rights,8" and the Legislature's intent to deviate from the
common law will not be found unless it is clearly expressed.86 Moreover, Washington law has long recognized the assignment of judg-

83.
84.
616-17,
85.
86.

Appellant's Opening Brief at 30-31, J.D. Tan, LLC (No. 46848-1-I).
Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Merchants' Rating & Adjusting Co., 183 Wash. 611,
49 P.2d 26, 28 (1935)).
Appellant's Opening Brief at 30,J.D. Tan, LLC (No. 46848-1-1).
Id. (citing McDonald v. Hayner, 43 Wash. App. 81, 84, 715 P.2d 519, 521-522 (1986)).
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ments as valuable property rights.87 Contractual rights, executory
contracts, choses in action, and other property rights, including judgments, are freely assignable unless the assignment is expressly prohibited by statute or contract or is in contravention of public policy.88 Although there is no per se common law right to extend a collection
period, there is a longstanding tendency to favor the free alienability of
property rights.8 9 As such, it is not unreasonable to conclude a policy
that favors the free alienability of property also favors the theory that
the assignee should enjoy the same rights as the assignor, including
the right to a ten-year extension under RCW 6.17.020(3).
Had the court determined RCW 6.17.020(3) was ambiguous, it
could have employed an analysis like the one set forth above to conclude the Legislature intended to include assignees within the purview
of subsection (3). Instead, the cursory result reached by the Court of
Appeals in J.D. Tan had the effect of construing subsection (3) in a
manner antagonistic to the common law rights of the assignee. If state
law mandates that precedent laid down at common law is not to be
departed from in the absence of a clear expression from the Legislature, how can the holding of J.D. Tan, in which a purported assignee is
left with something less than the entire "bundle of sticks" be justified?
Where can this "clear expression" from the Legislature be found?
Washington law has long held that various types of property
rights, including judgments, are freely assignable unless the assignment is expressly prohibited. 9 RCW 6.17.020(1) expressly provides
that judgments are assignable. Although RCW 6.17.020(3) did not
specifically name assignees at the time J.D. Tan was decided, this
provision did not bar them from the class of judgment holders with
the right of extension. Application of the maxim at hand to RCW
6.17.020(3) indicates J.D. Tan was wrongly decided; property rights
are assignable unless expressly prohibited. 1 Moreover, the Legislature did not express an intent to differentiate between assignees and

87. Appellant's Opening Brief at 30,J.D. Tan, LLC (No. 46848-1-I) (citing WASH. REV.
CODE § 4.56.090).
88. Appellant's Opening Brief at 30, J.D. Tan, LLC (No. 46848-1-I) (citing Berschauer/Phillips Constr. Co. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 124 Wash. 2d 816, 829, 881 P.2d 986,
993-994 (1994); Puget Sound Nat'l Bank v. State Dept. of Revenue, 123 Wash. 2d 284, 868 P.2d
127 (1994).
89. See POSNER, supranote 34, at 10-13.
90. See, e.g., Berschauer/Phillips Constr. Co., 124 Wash. 2d at 829, 881 P.2d at 993-994.
91. Id.
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the text of RCW 6.17.020(3), or in
original judgment holders in either
92
history.
legislative
the statute's
C. The Court's Formal Interpretationof RCW 6.17.020(3) Was
Inconsistent with Other Related Statutes, Thereby Contraveningthe
Maxim of In Pari Materia.
Had the Court of Appeals chosen to judicially interpret RCW
6.17.020(3) by applying the maxim of in pari materia,93 it probably
would have concluded that section 6.17.020(3) applied to assignees.
By examining the numerous other statutes that pertain to the collection of judgments and reading them in the same manner, in pari materia, it becomes clear that none of these statutes discriminate between
rights held by assignees and rights held by original judgment holders.
One of the fundamental rules of statutory construction is that the interpretation of statutes should be undertaken in such a manner as to
harmonize all acts, if possible.94 Washington law boasts many statutes
dealing with the collection of judgments that cannot be reconciled
with the interpretation of section 6.17.020(3) that is set forth by the
Court of Appeals in J.D. Tan.
Of the handful of Washington statutes that pertain to the collection of judgments, none of them discriminates between rights held by
assignees and rights held by original judgment holders. To illustrate,
RCW 4.56.210(1) provides that a judgment shall cease to be a lien or
charge against the estate or person of the judgment debtor after ten
years from the date of entry. Subsection (3) of this statute states: "A
lien based upon an underlying judgment continues in force for an additional ten year period if the period of execution for the underlying
judgment is extended under RCW 6.17.020." This statute does not
differentiate between the original judgment creditor and any subsequent holder of the judgment.95
The same can also be said for RCW 4.56.190, which provides for
attachment of a judgment lien to the real property owned by the
judgment debtor. This statute further provides that real estate "shall
92. See WASH. REV. CODE § 6.17.020(3) (2001); S. REP. No. 55-5827, Regular Sess.
(Wash. 1997) (declaring that both state and local government may assign public debts to collection agencies, which shall have the same remedies and powers enjoyed by assignees of private
creditors).
93. In pari materia means "[r]elating to the same matter or subject." In cases of statutory
interpretation, the common maxim is that statutes in pari materia are to be construed together.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 318 (Pocket ed. 1996).
94. Appellant's Opening Brief at 32, J.D. Tan, LLC (No. 46848-1-I) (citing Ropo, Inc. v.
Seattle, 67 Wash. 2d 574, 409 P.2d 148 (1965)).
95. Appellant's Opening Brief at 33, J.D. Tan, LLC (No. 46848-1-I).
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be held and bound to satisfy any judgment.. .for a period not to exceed ten years from the day on which such judgment was entered
unless the ten year period is extended in accordance with RCW
6.17.020(3). ''96 There is no requirement that the judgment be held by
the original judgment creditor, nor is there any indication the Legislature envisioned different "classes" of judgment holders. 9'
Similarly, RCW 6.32.010 provides for the right to conduct supplemental proceedings within ten years after the entry of a judgment;
this right may be extended pursuant to RCW 6.17.020(3)." s Again,
the statute neither states nor implies any difference in treatment between original judgment creditors and subsequent judgment holders.99
Additional support for this proposition can be found in RCW
6.32.015, which provides for the right of a judgment creditor to obtain
an order requiring the judgment debtor to answer interrogatories
"within ten years after entry of a judgment." The time period can be
extended pursuant to RCW 6.17.020(3)." °° Nothing in RCW
6.32.015 indicates that an assignee of the original judgment creditor
would not be entitled to the rights afforded by the statute.101
Finally, the Legislature did not intend to differentiate between
assignees and original judgment holders in RCW 4.16.020, which is a
statute of limitation. This statute also refers to the right of extension
afforded by RCW 6.17.020(3); like RCW 4.56.210, it does not discriminate between original judgment creditors and subsequent holders
of a judgment. 112 Along these lines, it is noteworthy that a multitude
of cases interpreting statutes of limitation stand for the proposal that
such statutes should be construed in favor of claimants.13 For example, in Shew v. Coon Bay Loafers, Inc., the Washington Supreme
Court held that if it is questionable as to which of two statutes of limitation are applicable to a particular situation, the statute providing the
longest period is generally applied." 4
Had the J.D. Tan court applied the maxim of in pari materia to
RCW 6.17.020(3), it probably would have concluded the Legislature
did not intend to differentiate between rights enjoyed by original
judgment holders and rights held by assignees. Each of the five stat96. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.56.190 (2001).
97. Id. at 34.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.020 (2001).
103. Appellant's Opening Brief at 33, J.D. Tan, LLC (No. 46848-1-1).
104. Shew v. Coon Bay Loafers, Inc., 76 Wash. 2d 40, 455 P.2d 359 (1969).
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utes listed above pertains to the enforcement of judgments, and none of
them differentiates between assignees and original judgment holders.
Furthermore, the reasoning set forth in Shew seems particularly appropriate given the facts of the case at hand: in instances of uncertainty, claimants, not debtors, should be given the benefit of the doubt
because of their valid, legally recognized claims. Courts award judgments in the hope of adequately compensating injured parties; laws
providing for this compensation should be used not as debtors' loopholes for escape, but rather as means for achieving equitable ends.
D. The Court Was Chargedwith InterpretingRCW 6.17.020(3) in
Accordance with the Manifest Intent of the Legislature.
When analyzing an ambiguous statute, the Washington judiciary
is obligated to construe the statute so as to effectuate legislative intent."'5 In so doing, courts are to avoid a literal reading if it would result in unlikely, absurd or strained consequences. 1 6 The purpose of an
enactment should prevail over express but inept wording. 107
Had the J.D. Tan court attempted to interpret RCW 6.17.020(3)
by ascertaining the intent of the Legislature, it probably would have
concluded that the Legislature intended to provide assignees all of the
rights set forth in subsection (3). This interpretation follows from the
statute because there is no legislative record indicating what the intent
of the Legislature was in drafting the statute, and assignees are not
specifically mentioned in the legislative history. The legislative history of RCW 6.17.020(3) indicates that the statute was intended to
benefit judgment holders in general. There does not appear to be any
intent on the part of the Legislature to differentiate between original
judgment creditors and subsequent assignees." 8 In fact,
the initial Bill was conceived and thereafter promulgated almost
single-handedly by a large coalition of professional assignees collection agencies - who were aggrieved by the inflexibility of
the ten-year statute of limitations for the enforcement of judgments and who sought relief from its strictures in light of the recurrent problem of certain difficult-to-collect judgments.109
105. Whatcom County v. City of Bellingham, 128 Wash. 2d 537, 546, 909 P.2d 1303,
1308 (1996).
106. State v. Elgin, 118 Wash. 2d 551, 555, 825 P.2d 314, 316 (1992).
107. Appellant's Opening Brief at 38, J.D, Tan, LLC (No. 46848-1-I) (citing Elgin, 118
Wash. 2d at 555, 825 P.2d at 316).
108. Appellant's Opening Brief at 13, J.D. Tan, LLC (No. 46848-1-I).
109. Id. (citing Declarations of collection agency lobbyists Mark Gjurasic, Kevin Underwood, and Pat Mitchell (emphasis added)).
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Although there was no specific mention of assignees at any point
in this Bill's legislative history, there was also no evidence that the
Legislature intended to establish two separate classes of judgment
creditors with respect to the right to obtain extensions of judgments."'
Remarkably, much evidence exists to the contrary; the assignees' lobbyists conceived and promulgated the initial bill, which suggests that
the Legislature intended to benefit assignees in RCW 6.17.020(3).
Moreover, the only individuals who testified on behalf of the Bill were
lobbyists representing the collection agency associations."' One of these
key individuals, Kevin Underwood, was an attorney for Allied Credit
Companies." 2 Mr. Underwood worked closely with the Washington
Collectors' Association Legislative Committee in introducing the Bill,
and he testified before both the House and Senate committees in favor
of its passage. The following passage is taken from his deposition in
the J.D. Tan case:
[The bill] was introduced by the Senate Law and Justice Committee at the behest of a large coalition of professional collection
entities whose concern was their ability to enforce certain hardto-collect judgments assigned to them... by original judgment
creditors. There was never, throughout the entire time that this
bill was being drafted or considered, any discussion - either by
legislative committee members or their staff - of an intent to deprive assignees, as opposed to original judgment creditors, of the
ability to avail themselves of the benefit of the proposed statute.
To the contrary, the express intent of the bill was to extend the
period during which a judgment could be enforced, regardless of
whether the party attempting to renew the judgment were the
original judgment creditor or a subsequent assignee.
It is safe to say that neither I nor my clients [professional collection entities] would have taken any interest in promoting this
bill and in assuring its passage had there been any indication of a
legislative intent to "cut us out" of its provisions. "'
Some evidence exists that indicates at least one legislator was
aware of the collection agency lobbyists' interest in passing SB 6045
(SB 6045 eventually became RCW 6.17.020(3)). In a March 4, 1994
memorandum to Senator Adam Smith, legislative staff member Marty
Lovinger raised concerns about SB 6045's provision for a filing fee in
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 14.
Id. (emphasis added).
Appellant's Opening Brief at 19, J.D. Tan, LLC (No. 46848-1-I).
Id.
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connection with the extension of a judgment, observing that collection
agencies (who by definition take judgments by assignment, either outright or for collection purposes) would be among those judgment
creditors availing themselves of the benefits of RCW 6.17.020(3)."'
While the memorandum between Lovinger and Senator Smith by itself is hardly dispositive, it is a persuasiveindicator of the legislative intent behind the passage of the bill, especially when considered in connection with the testimony of several collection agency lobbyists who
were instrumental in promulgating RCW 6.17.020(3).
Although courts have generally not valued declarations of legislative intent offered by lobbyists,"' no statute, court rule, or case exists
that prohibits courts from relying on such evidence if it is deemed reliable, or if no conflicting evidence of legislative intent exists. Perhaps
J.D. Tan constituted an appropriate instance to consider such evidence, considering both its abundance and its highly persuasive nature.
V. CONCLUSION

The holding of J.D. Tan yielded a result that was inequitable to
assignees of judgments; assignees were denied rights that were extended to original judgment holders without credible evidence that the
Legislature intended this result. The main problem presented by J.D.
Tan was subsequently remedied by way of a recent amendment to
RCW 6.17.020(3) to include the words "or the assignee," whereby
lawmakers put an end to the inequity created by the J.D. Tan case.
However, this kind of measure merely serves as a Band-Aid® or
short-term fix to a problem of a grander scale.
Instead of relying on legislative action to clarify ambiguous statutes, the Washington judiciary must be increasingly held accountable
for carrying out its duty of interpreting statutes that are undeniably
ambiguous. Perhaps this end will materialize through implementation
of new court rules, or additional legislation. Regardless of the remedial method employed, avoidance of problems like those seen in J.D.
Tan will undoubtedly result in substantial societal good: patently absurd or unfair results will be diminished, as will societal waste in the
form of uncollected debts and needless litigation.

114. Id. at 15.
115. Talmadge, supra note 7, at 181 (citing W. Telepage, Inc. v. City of Tacoma, 140
Wash. 2d 599, 611, 998 P.2d 884, 891 (2000) (finding that noncontemporaneous understanding
of lobbyist as to legislative intent was not reflective of legislature's rationale for enacting law).

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 26:149

Taken together, the maxims of statutory interpretation strongly
suggest that the Legislature did not intend to exclude assignees from
the purview of RCW 6.17.020(3) for four reasons. First, RCW
6.17.020(3) is a remedial statute, and remedial statutes should be construed in accordance with common law." 6 It is hornbook law that the
assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor, and enjoys all rights and
privileges of the party assigning its interest unless clearly expressed
otherwise.11 7 In this case, there is no clear statement anywhere that
purportedly limits the assignee's interest.
Second, state law requires civil statutes in derogation of common
law rights to be strictly construed.' 18 Moreover, fundamental tenets of
property law support a holding that RCW 6.17.020(3) could have
been reasonably read to apply to assignees, given that assignees were
not expressly excluded therein. One reason why the free alienability
of property has long been encouraged by the law is because this policy
encourages the most efficient utilization of resources. 19 Reading
RCW 6.17.020(3) to include assignees comports with this policy. The
original judgment creditor, who may be unwilling or unable to execute
its judgment for any one of a variety of reasons, could obtain redress
nevertheless by selling its judgment to an assignee. As a result, a
valuable property right (which in the case of J.D. Tan was a judgment
for almost $1.8 million) would not go to waste by escaping collection.
Third, according to the maxim of in pari materia, the purpose of
an ambiguous statute is to be determined through comparison to other
related statutes.1 ° Each of the five statutes examined above pertain to
the collection of judgments, and not one of them explicitly or implicitly
differentiates between assignees and original judgment creditors. Finally, although there is little (if any) legislative history that might have
shed light on the legislative intent behind RCW 6.17.020(3), the testimony of those lobbyists who were active in promulgating the aforementioned Bill is somewhat persuasive,
and the court should have at
12 1
least considered this testimony.

116. See Vashon Island Comm. for Self-Gov't v. State Boundary Review Bd., 127 Wash.
2d 759, 903 P.2d 953 (1995).
117. Appellant's Opening Brief at 31,J.D. Tan, LLC (No. 46848-1-I).
118. See, e.g.,Wichert v. Cardwell, 117 Wash. 2d 148, 153, 603 P.2d 858, 860 (1991).
119. See POSNER, supra note 34, at 10-13.
120. See, e.g., In re Yim, 139 Wash. 2d 581, 592, 989 P.2d 512, 517-518 (1991).
121. See POSNER, supra note 34, at 10-13.

